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An emergent form of blockchain governance involves the use of formal games that 
give participants incentives to identify focal resolutions to normative questions. 
This symposium contribution provides a brief survey of the literature proposing 
and critiquing the use of such mechanisms, and it evaluates early laboratory and 
real-world experiments with this approach to decentralized decisionmaking. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Merriam-Webster dictionary illustrates the phrase “slower than 
molasses” with an example sentence about the workings of a legislature.1 However 
slow legislatures may be in developing new legislation, the process of evolution of 
governance itself is far slower. It is a tribute to the genius of their designers that our 
democratic institutions still function, more or less, according to the same core 
procedures as existed when they were created, but it is also a testament to the 
challenges inherent in changing the rules by which other rules are created. Because 
the processes of governance lie at the core of any democratic government, any 
mistakes in developing new governance procedures can have adverse effects for 
substantive law. What’s more, it is difficult to judge whether governance 
experiments are successful. We cannot run a randomized controlled trial in which 
half of state legislatures adopt one legislative procedure while the other half adopt 
another, and even if we could, it would likely be impossible to identify criteria for 
determining which half the states produced better laws.2 Corporations can 
experiment more easily with governance than legislatures, but the incentives to do 
so are still limited.3 It will rarely be possible to attribute a corporation’s success or 
failure to a specific governance initiative rather than to a corporation’s business 
model. And if a governance initiative were provably successful, most of the benefits 
would flow to copycats rather than to the original innovator.4 
Yet in the past few years, there has been a flurry of experimentation with 
governance. This experimentation has taken place not in the legislature or in the 
boardroom, but on the blockchain. The experiments are borne of necessity. 
1
See https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/slower%20than%20molasses (“People have 
complained that the legislature is moving/working slower than molasses.”). 
2
 For discussions of legal experimentation, see Michael Abramowicz et al., Randomizing Law, 159 
U. PA. L. REV. 929 (2011); and Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998)
3
 On the slow pace of corporate governance innovation, see Michael Abramowicz, Speeding up the 
Crawl to the Top, 20 YALE J. ON REG. 139 (2003); Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, 
Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk: Reconsidering the Competition over Corporate Charters, 112 
YALE L.J. 553 (2002); and Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in 
Corporate Law, 55 STAN. L. REV. 679 (2002).  
4
 On the implications of the lack of intellectual property protection in governance, see Ian Ayres, 
Supply-Side Inefficiencies in Corporate Charter Competition: Lessons from Patents, Yachting and 
Bluebooks, 43 U. KAN. L. REV. 541 (1995). 
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Disputes about governance have sometimes led to “hard forks” in blockchains and 
cryptocurrencies. This occurred most notably in the case of the hard fork of the 
leading cryptocurrency by market capitalization, Bitcoin, into Bitcoin Cash, 
following debate about the best way to scale Bitcoin to increase its transaction 
volume.5 This hard fork left owners of bitcoins with ownership in two competing 
cryptocurrencies. On one hand, the availability of hard forks illustrates that there is 
a governance mechanism native to cryptocurrencies. If a cryptocurrency’s value 
stems entirely from the community’s belief that the cryptocurrency has value, then 
that value can be subdivided into child cryptocurrencies. On the other hand, a 
cryptocurrency may be more cumbersome to use and less valuable once split into 
pieces, so mechanisms that avoid hard forks may be preferable. 
In principle, a blockchain, whether in the form of a cryptocurrency or not, 
can use any conventional governance mechanism. Indeed, many private companies 
have created “permissioned blockchains,”6 wholly under their control and thus 
subject to change through ordinary governance procedures. But many blockchains, 
particularly cryptocurrencies, are implemented through open-source software.7 The 
originator of a cryptocurrency project may control the repository for the software 
code, but in a typical licensing arrangement,8 anyone else may copy the software. 
And even if the software were not freely copyable, if the protocol the software 
implements is publicly known, others can implement the protocol in software of 
their own or borrow the best features of that software for a competing product. 
Moreover, cryptocurrency projects often reflect an anarcho-libertarian philosophy 
of decentralization. A blockchain is typically the result of a decentralized process 
for determining which transactions should be included on a ledger, and some may 
thus have an ideological aversion to a centralized, hierarchical governance scheme 
for determining how the protocol that generates this process is defined.  
Thus, the development of blockchains has led to two sources of demand for 
decentralized decisionmaking: first, a perceived need to coordinate developments 
of particular blockchains without hard forks, and second, the view that a 
decentralized system should be decentralized not only at the operational level but 
also at the level of governance. Further generating interest in decentralized 
                                                 
5
 See, e.g., Nathaniel Popper, Some Bitcoin Backers Are Defecting to Create a Rival Currency, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 25, 2017, available at 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/25/business/dealbook/bitcoin-cash-split.html.  
6
 See, e.g., The Difference Between Permissioned and Permissionless Blockchains, SEPA FOR 
CORPORATES (Dec. 6, 2017), available at https://www.sepaforcorporates.com/thoughts/difference-
between-permissioned-permissionless-blockchains/. 
7
 See, e.g., https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin (providing the Bitcoin repository). 
8
 See, e.g., https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/master/COPYING (containing the content of the 
MIT license applicable to Bitcoin). 
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decisionmaking in blockchains is the entrepreneurial cryptocurrency ecosystem. 
When entrepreneurs witnessed Initial Coin Offerings based on blockchain 
innovations represented purely in code generate tens of millions of dollars in 
capital,9 they naturally sought to identify new potential blockchain innovations 
along many dimensions, of which governance is just one. Skeptics of 
cryptocurrencies may observe that cryptocurrencies are so innovative only because 
they are so devoid of underlying substance. Children playing in the schoolyard can 
fashion new rules for their games quickly, because the stakes are so low. But 
whether cryptocurrencies were or are in a bubble, the froth has produced a great 
deal of thought and experimentation with decentralized governance. 
By decentralized governance, I mean a set of rules that allow some 
collective to produce discernible decisions without appointing individuals or 
entities to make those decisions. A direct democracy can represent a form of 
decentralized governance, if there is some set of rules for identifying who is entitled 
to vote and some means of counting the votes to determine the result of the vote. 
Ownership of cryptocurrency and other blockchain assets is often obscured, so 
there is no simple way to implement the principle of “one person, one vote.”10 But 
some cryptocurrencies have experimented with the principle of “one token, one 
vote,” through which those with greater ownership rights are given greater 
decisionmaking power.11 Such voting arrangements are not my interest here, in part 
because they present a problem akin to that of majority shareholder oppression of 
minority shareholders.12  
My focus in this Article is on a different approach to decentralized 
governance, in which not only are there no appointed officials, but also there are no 
votes, at least as voting is conventionally conceived. The approach bases decisions 
on an algorithm that identifies focal resolutions of normative issues. A simple 
example can give the gist of this type of mechanism. Suppose that I plan to give a 
sizeable donation to either the American Cancer Society or the Save the Wolves 
Foundation, and I do not want to split the donation between them. I solicit help 
                                                 
9
 See, e.g., Paul Vigna & Dave Michaels, Are ICO Tokens Securities? Startup Wants a Judge to 
Decide, WALL ST. J., Jan. 27, 2019, available at https://www.wsj.com/articles/are-ico-tokens-
securities-startup-wants-a-judge-to-decide-11548604800 (including a list of the largest initial coin 
offerings in 2017). 
10
 See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz, Cryptocurrency-Based Law, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 359, 363 (2016) 
(explaining why this is difficult with cryptocurrencies). 
11
 Cryptocurrencies have also experimented with variations. One interesting variation is Dfinity, 
which creates a reputation network, in which the result of decisions depend on a combination of 
votes and on formal trust relationships. See, e.g., Dominic Williams, The DFINITY “Blockchain 
Nervous System,” MEDIUM, Jan. 4, 2017, available at https://medium.com/dfinity/the-dfinity-
blockchain-nervous-system-a5dd1783288e. 
12
 See generally Robert C. Art, Shareholder Rights and Remedies in Close Corporations: 
Oppression, Fiduciary Duties, and Reasonable Expectations, 28 J. CORP. L. 371 (2003). 
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from students in my class. I choose students at random and ask them one at a time 
to state which charity I should choose and to explain the choice. I promise to give 
each student (other than the last) $1 if that student announces the same answer as 
the last student I call on. I will stop based calling on students at a random point, for 
example if a coin that I flip lands on heads twice in a row. Whatever the last student 
says determines the charity to which I will donate. 
Assuming that each student cares only about the dollar and not about which 
charity actually receives the money or about some other factor such as personal 
reputation, then the student should announce the charity that the student anticipates 
the last student will announce. But because the last student will not know that she 
is last, she too will be anticipating the reasoning of a later decisionmaker. If one 
knew that the last student would choose between the charities based on which was 
earlier in alphabetical order or based on some other arbitrary criterion, every other 
student would have an incentive to follow that same arbitrary criterion. But there 
are an infinite number of arbitrary criteria, so the normative criterion of which 
charity is better by the lights of those participating in the game stands out. Thus, a 
student intent on winning the dollar will likely evaluate the relative merits of the 
charities, placing aside idiosyncratic beliefs, and then offer any explanation 
designed to make others conclude that the choice is a good one. 
This mechanism is not without its problems. Still, it is a decentralized 
process that will always produce a clear result, in much the same way as legislative 
rules can lead to a conclusive determination of whether a bill has been enacted into 
law, placing to the side edge cases, such as when one might argue whether a 
particular legislator is rightfully a member of the body. A blockchain is a system 
that can record a series of transactions, such as the charity preference 
announcements, and it is possible for cryptocurrencies to pay out the rewards (or 
collect the penalties) needed to provide participants with the relevant incentives. 
Thus, this is a potential form of cryptocurrency governance, and its merits or 
demerits must ultimately be compared with those of other forms of blockchain 
governance. 
This Article’s project is to offer a history of this approach to decentralized 
governance. I was the first person to consider the possibility of decentralized 
governance systems along these lines two decades ago, well before the advent of 
Bitcoin and the blockchain, and so I will begin by summarizing the argument of my 
original article. In the past few years, the advent of blockchain led me to return to 
the topic, describing how this form of decentralized governance could be executed 
on the blockchain. In fact, it turned out to be unnecessary for me to return to the 
issue, as other commentators simultaneously recognized the possibility of similar 
types of mechanisms. Meanwhile, there have been experiments on similar 
mechanisms, both in the laboratory and in the real world, with mixed results. After 
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describing these experiments and projects, I will conclude by offering some 
recommendations for future designs and experiments. 
II. IDENTIFYING DECISIONS THROUGH SCHELLING POINTS 
This Part provides a brief intellectual history of decentralized blockchain 
governance based on the identification of “Schelling focal points.” Section II.A 
recounts what a Schelling point is and points out that individuals often coordinate 
on Schelling points, but without producing quantifiable answers to normative 
questions. The formal games described in Section II.B give each player incentives 
to provide quantitative assessments on matters of opinion equal to the assessments 
that future players will make, and the end of the process of soliciting such answers 
can thus, by convention or rule, result in an answer to the normative question posed. 
Section II.C describes various approaches that can result in the implementation of 
such a formal game in a cryptocurrency. 
A. Informal Coordination with Schelling Points 
The game theorist Thomas Schelling recognized the existence of 
“coordination games,” in which each player’s outcome depended on whether that 
player succeeds in making the same move as another player.13 To illustrate the idea, 
he conducted a survey, largely of New York area residents, in which he asked each 
respondent what that person would do if the respondent needed to meet someone 
the next day in New York City, but could not coordinate on a time or place. The 
majority of respondents chose Grand Central Station’s information booth at noon.14 
Schelling’s point was not that this was a game that the government should 
encourage individuals to play, but rather that individuals effectively played such 
tacit coordination games in everyday situations, such as when a couple gets lost in 
an department store.15 
Coordination around Schelling points occurs not just in the department 
store. David Friedman has argued that Schelling point coordination is central to 
social organization more broadly.16 Friedman points out that Schelling points can 
serve to help resolve conflicts. In the absence of a Schelling point, there may be an 
infinite number of resolutions to a bilateral bargaining game, so “each proposal by 
one player is likely to call forth a competing proposal from another, slanted a little 
                                                 
13
 THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 54-57 (1980). 
14
 Id. at 55 n.1.  
15
 Id. at 54.  
16
 See David Friedman, A Positive Account of Property Rights, 11 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 1 (1994). 
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more in his own interest.”17 But if “there is one outcome that is seen as unique,” the 
parties may readily agree to it rather than face continued bargaining, because a 
statement that a party insists on that resolution rather than one a small distance away 
becomes credible.18 Moreover, even without the possibility of enforcement, 
contracts can create Schelling points. Though an unenforceable contract can always 
be renegotiated, the original agreement is focal, and so each party may prefer that 
agreement to the alternative of continued bargaining.19 
More ambitiously, Schelling points can be seen as the foundation of 
government itself. Hans Kelsen famously argued that every legal system has one 
basic norm, the grundnorm, from which the legitimacy of all other legal norms and 
conclusions follow.20 Acceptance of the basic norm that the government’s duly 
enacted rules are binding can be seen as the result of a Schelling point game. Each 
person accepts the law as binding because each person anticipates that each other 
will conclude that it is binding. The exception proves the rule: The grundnorm can 
change after a revolution.21 The revolution is successful when it is viewed as 
successful, as having changed the grundnorm. The perception of success is success, 
because those with power have incentives to wield it in accordance with what they 
perceive as the new grundnorm. 
More generally, Schelling points can explain coordination in contexts in 
which network externalities exist. A canonical example of network externalities is 
computer operating systems.22 A user adopting an operating system often wishes to 
use the same one that others will use. This is not necessarily the one with the 
greatest market share, however, but the one that will have the highest market share 
in the future. Cryptocurrencies themselves reflect this logic. What explains the 
market capitalization dominance of Bitcoin and to a lesser degree of Ethereum? It 
cannot be that they have more features than alternatives, because anyone can fork 
them at any time. It is because they are focal, in large part because Bitcoin was the 
first decentralized cryptocurrency and because Ethereum was the first to offer 
robust smart contracts. Others gain market share to the extent that they become 
                                                 
17




 Id. at 3 (beginning explanation of why contracts may be useful in a state of nature, even though 
they are unenforceable). 
20
 See generally HANS KELSEN, THE GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND THE STATE (1945); Joseph Raz, 
Kelsen’s Theory of the Basic Norm, 19 AM. J. JURIS. 94 (1974). 
21
 See N.W. Barber & Adrian Vermeule, The Exceptional Role of Courts in the Constitutional Order, 
92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 817, 842 (2016) (discussing the grundnorm and how it can change).  
22
 See, e.g., Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., An Antitrust Remedy for Monopoly Leveraging by Electronic 
Networks, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 8-12 (1998) (discussing the relevance of network externalities to 
the Microsoft antitrust investigation). 
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focal, for example by incorporating innovative features. Meanwhile, within a 
particular cryptocurrency, a blockchain is authoritative in large part as a result of a 
Schelling coordination game. Anyone can fork Bitcoin with software that reflects 
some new principle for determining the valid blockchain,23 but the principle that 
Bitcoin uses to identify the valid blockchain (i.e., the blockchain reflecting the 
greatest proof of work) is highly focal, because it was announced in advanced as a 
core principle. Schelling point coordination thus determines the relative value of 
cryptocurrencies and also the valid blockchain within a particular cryptocurrency.24 
B. Formal Coordination with Schelling Points 
The use of Schelling points described above is informal: One does not 
choose where to meet in a department store or how much to value a cryptocurrency 
by processing numeric announcements according to some algorithm to produce a 
definitive answer. But it is possible to devise a formal game that gives participants 
incentives to find focal points. The goal of a formal game can be seen as converting 
numeric statements on a matter of opinion into an objective fact pursuant to some 
algorithm; the game can be said to work if that objective fact corresponds 
meaningfully to actual consensus opinion, even if individuals may have incentives 
to manipulate the game.  
Such a game might occur in a single round. John Maynard Keynes famously 
described a contest in which “competitors have to pick out the six prettiest faces 
from a hundred photographs, the prize being awarded to the competitor whose 
choice most nearly corresponds to the average preferences of the competitors as a 
whole.”25 Keynes’ worry that such a contest has no economic foundation is sound, 
but, depending on the precise rules, it may lead each competitor to try to find a focal 
point.26 Thus, Keynes should perhaps receive credit for suggesting the possibility 
of an algorithm that might give each participant an incentive to suppress an 
individual opinion in favor of the perceived group consensus, but in fact he neither 
explained the precise algorithm of the competition he described nor evaluated the 
                                                 
23
 Indeed, the Bitcoin Cash fork announced new rules that thus led to the recognition of a different 
blockchain.  
24
 See, e.g., Joshua A. Kroll et al., The Economics of Bitcoin Mining, or Bitcoin in the Presence of 
Adversaries 2 (2013), available at 
https://www.econinfosec.org/archive/weis2013/papers/KrollDaveyFeltenWEIS2013.pdf 
(“Participants must maintain consensus (1) on the rules to determine validity of transactions, (2) on 
which transactions have occurred in the system, and (3) that the currency has value.”). 
25
 JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST, AND MONEY 156 
(Harcourt Brace ed., 1936).  
26
 This might not be so if the contest is winner-take-all, in which case “one may have an incentive 
to deviate randomly from one’s estimate of the consensus value.” Michael Abramowicz, 
Cyberadjudication, 86 IOWA L. REV. 533, 545 (2001). 
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dynamics that would result from implementing it. This is because Keynes was 
skeptical that such a process could produce a meaningful answer. Keynes predated 
Schelling, and though his example highlights intuitions about focal points, the 
purpose of Keynes’s argument was to express skepticism about markets without 
sufficiently strong underlying fundamentals. By implication, Keynes would be 
even more skeptical about an algorithm that relied on focal points alone. 
An algorithm for a single-round game is easy to devise. On a binary issue, 
for example, each participant can be instructed to write down an answer and the 
participants who reach the answer preferred by the majority can receive a bonus 
payment, perhaps at the expense of those who wrote down the minority answer. A 
formal Schelling point game, however, also may occur over multiple rounds. I 
described variations of such an algorithm, in my 2001 article Cyberadjudication.27 
I assumed that in each round, a single gambler would announce a number. The rules 
of the game ensure that the gambler “will always do best by trying to predict what 
will happen in the next round,” and “will increase her winnings the further her own 
bet is from the average in the previous round.”28 I then gave an example of one 
approach that could satisfy these constraints. In this approach, a security 
corresponding to some normative question (e.g., “Plaintiff in Case X should win 
the lawsuit”) would be auctioned.29 The winner of the auction would then be 
required to value this security, and that valuation would entitle anyone else to either 
purchase the security at that price or sell short an identical security to the holder of 
the security. When the game ends, the current holder of the security receives the 
amount of the current valuation, which also determines the official resolution of the 
normative question, and the short sales are resolved based on this price. 
In this instantiation of a formal Schelling point game, the forced transaction 
rules are critical. They provide incentives for participants not to value too low or 
too high relative to the anticipated last valuation. Because the incentives for this 
last valuation are the same, at least so long as the last valuer does not know that the 
game is about to end, the game is entirely circular. But this does not mean that it is 
useless. Rather, participants must value relative to a focal point.  
This is not, however, the only way to structure a multi-round Schelling point 
game. In my book Predictocracy,30 I described a similar mechanism, which I called 
                                                 
27
 See id. 
28
 Id. at 541. I also assumed that any one gambler’s funds are small relative to the funds of those 
who could play the game, and that the house places itself at a disadvantage as a way of subsidizing 
participation in the game. Id. at 542-43. Another important assumption is that participants do not 
know precisely when the game will end. Id. at 541 n.13. 
29
 Id. at 556-70. 
30
 MICHAEL ABRAMOWICZ, PREDICTOCRACY: MARKET MECHANISMS FOR PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 
DECISION MAKING (2008). 
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a self-resolving prediction market.31 A prediction market is a securities market in 
which the security will be redeemed at a price based on some event in the real 
world.32 For example, popular prediction markets are used to forecast the 
probability that each candidate will be elected to a governmental position. Some 
prediction markets allow participants to trade with one another, and the most recent 
trading price can be translated into the market’s prediction of the underlying event. 
Other prediction markets use automated market maker mechanisms, in which 
participants trade against the sponsor of the market according to pre-determined 
rules.33 I defined a self-resolving prediction market as simply a prediction market 
with an automated market maker whose final value is the last transaction value at 
some time-to-be-determined, where the precise time is hidden from the players.  A 
market design that rewards participants based on how close they are to the final 
price gives participants incentives not only to identify the focal point, but also to 
change it, for example by introducing new legal or factual arguments.34  
Could a scheme like this be a viable mechanism for conducting 
adjudication, placing aside the further question of whether it might be superior in 
any context to centralized approaches to providing adjudication? The most obvious 
objection to the scheme is that while participants will have an incentive to look for 
a focal point, there is no guarantee that the focal point that participants settle on 
will be the resolution of the question associated with the market. A focal point 
might be affected by moral considerations independent of the legal questions posed. 
That is, if there is a “moral” focal point and a “legal” focal point, participants might 
see the ultimate focal point as a weighted average of these two focal points.35 This 
is not necessarily a decisive objection, however. Maybe it is affirmatively good for 
moral considerations to affect decisionmaking, and in any event, surely in actual 
adjudications, judges’ perceptions of morality (or efficiency or the optimum for any 
other framework) affect their decisions. 
Fatal to the scheme, however, would be numbers that become focal for 
wholly arbitrary reasons. Perhaps a number will seem focal because it is a round 
                                                 
31
 Id. at 290-94. 
32




 See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz, The Hidden Beauty of the Quadratic Market Scoring Rule: A 
Uniform Liquidity Market Maker, with Variations, 1 J. PREDICTION MKTS. 111 (2007). 
34
 Participants can also have incentives to produce relevant arguments if the market concludes based 
on some realized state of the world (such as who wins an election), so long as the market is 
periodically resolved based on the current price. See ABRAMOWICZ, supra note 30, at 119-26; 
Michael Abramowicz, Deliberative Information Markets for Small Groups, in INFORMATION 
MARKETS: A NEW WAY OF MAKING DECISIONS 101 (Robert W. Hahn & Paul C. Tetlock eds., 2006). 
35
 Abramowicz, supra note 26, at 549-51. 
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number. I argued that this seems unlikely, because there are many numbers that 
have some focal attribute (prime numbers, well-known dates, and so forth), and so 
the question for participants is why a number should be focal in a particular instance 
of the game. But it is ultimately an empirical question. Meanwhile, in a Schelling 
point game, participants and those affected by the decision may have incentives to 
create new focal numbers, for example by announcing them loudly or by 
committing credibly to playing the Schelling game and betting on those numbers 
themselves. Yet this strategy creates incentives for others to push the original focal 
point. If A announces a manipulative number, then B can return to the original focal 
point in the next round. So long as each has only a small percentage of funds 
available to invest in the game, the question becomes what the broader set of 
participants will view as more focal. 
C. Schelling Points in Cryptocurrency 
When I originally described the possibility that Schelling point games might 
be used to perform decisionmaking, I assumed that these games would occur in the 
context of an existing government. For example, a corporation might commit to 
make decisions based on prediction markets,36 and such a promise could be 
enforced through ordinary contracts in ordinary courts. A prediction market itself 
would be centralized, even though participants in the prediction markets could be 
dispersed. In Predictocracy, I mentioned that it might be possible “to have 
government decisions based entirely on decentralized prediction markets,”37 but I 
did not describe how this might work. The advent of cryptocurrencies and the 
blockchain, however, establishes that at least some decisions—such as determining 
which ledger of transactions is the authoritative one—can be accomplished in a 
wholly decentralized way.  
Thus, after the emergence of Bitcoin, I returned to my earlier work on 
Schelling points, explaining how it might be possible to implement a formal 
Schelling point game on a decentralized cryptocurrency not controlled by any 
government.38 Schelling point games and cryptocurrencies are each designed to be 
decentralized, but each has a fundamental point of centralization. The Schelling 
point games as I had previously described would ultimately be enforced by 
government-created courts enforcing contracts, and cryptocurrencies’ software 
code must be maintained in a repository by some organization. But if a Schelling 
point game is used to determine how a cryptocurrency supporting smart contracts 
evolves, decentralization comes full circle, with the cryptocurrency providing a 
                                                 
36
 See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz & M. Todd Henderson, Prediction Markets for Corporate 
Governance, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1343 (2007). 
37
 ABRAMOWICZ, supra note 30, at 289. 
38
 See Abramowicz, supra note 10. 
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platform for ensuring that Schelling game participants receive (or pay) the 
appropriate amounts, and the Schelling game used to determine whether proposed 
amendments to the cryptocurrency software protocol should be accepted. 
Unsurprisingly, given concerns about cryptocurrency governance and a 
sympathy among many cryptocurrency advocates for decentralized decisionmaking 
approaches, I was not the only person to hit on the idea of using formal Schelling 
point games to make decisions on a blockchain. The next section describes several 
proposals for integrating Schelling point decisionmaking into the blockchain, and I 
then turn to a concern that attacks against Schelling point decisionmaking would 
make it untenable. 
1. Autonocoin, SchellingCoin, and TruthCoin Proposals 
In describing a blockchain-based Schelling point coordination game, I 
offered an approach considerably simpler than the “forced transaction rules” and 
prediction market that I had described earlier. Suppose that a cryptocurrency faces 
a binary decision, such as whether to approve a new checkpoint. A cryptocurrency 
could handle this by defining a transaction that initiates the question and then 
allowing holders of cryptocurrency to transfer cryptocurrency to designated 
addresses corresponding to “Yes” and “No.” Once a round occurred in which there 
was a sufficiently low level of activity, the winner would be declared to be the 
position with more total support. All of the currency spent would be allocated to 
the winners. Earlier supporters of the winning position would receive funds before 
later supporters, so there would be no incentive to pile onto the winning position. I 
explained how this approach would give each participant the incentive to choose a 
position consistent with what the next participant would be more likely than not to 
do.39 
I expanded on this mechanism in an article suggesting the possibility of a 
cryptocurrency based on a concept that I termed “proof-of-belief.”40 I named the 
cryptocurrency Autonocoin to highlight that the cryptocurrency would be a self-
governing, autonomous decentralized entity. With Autonocoin, all governance 
decisions would be made on the cryptocurrency itself. In addition to making binary 
decisions, the cryptocurrency could resolve questions of how much reward 
someone who contributed to the cryptocurrency should receive, for example by 
contributing software or by marketing the cryptocurrency or adopting it for 
financial transactions.41 Moreover, I explained how Autonocoin could be used to 
                                                 
39
 Id. at 390-95. 
40
 See Michael Abramowicz, Autonocoin: A Proof-of-Belief Cryptocurrency, 1 LEDGER 119 (2016). 
41
 Another blockchain project that has recognized the importance of providing blockchain-based 
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make the decision central to all cryptocurrencies: the determination of which is the 
correct blockchain. The principle would be that the correct blockchain is the one 
that has the most “proof of belief.” A participant can sign transactions indicating 
that the participant thinks that a blockchain is authoritative, and other participants 
can sign transactions indicating the reverse. Autonocoin would embody a 
convention that these transactions determine which blockchain in fact is 
authoritative (that is, the one with the greatest degree of committed resources), and 
those who properly identify the correct blockchain earn a reward for expressing 
their proof of belief, while those who endorse the wrong blockchain lose their 
stakes. In general, there would likely be little controversy about the authoritative 
blockchain, given the existence of clear rules for determining which transactions a 
blockchain should include, but there might be edge cases that the Autonocoin 
mechanism could resolve. 
At least two other commentators considered the possibility of Schelling 
point mechanisms at around the same time as me (and indeed published on the 
Internet before the publication of my articles). One of these was Vitalik Buterin, 
the creator of Ethereum, who considered the possibility in a blog post.42 Buterin 
considered using a Schelling game not to resolve a subjective question, but an 
objective one, specifically about the current value of a unit of Ether cryptocurrency 
in terms of dollars. The ability to obtain this value would be useful because it would 
enable hedging in smart contracts. Although the value is in some sense objective, 
if a decentralized mechanism is needed for determining the correct value, then the 
smart contract requires third parties to report what they believe is the correct value; 
if there are differences in the value reported, then the analysis of which is correct is 
subjective. And thus the determination of an objective value in a decentralized way 
requires Schelling point decisionmaking as much as determination of a subjective 
value. 
Buterin proposes the following mechanism: Users can submit hashes of 
transactions including their estimate of the ETH/USD price during even-numbered 
block and can then reveal cryptographically unveil their estimates during the 
subsequent block.43 Once that block is complete, the submitted and revealed values 
would determine the answer, with “[e]very user who submitted a correctly 
                                                 
Objective Layer (June 8, 2016), available at 
https://github.com/Backfeed/documents/blob/master/whitepaper_objective_protocol.pdf. 
42
 Vitalik Buterin, SchellingCoin: A Minimal-Trust Universal Data Feed, 
https://blog.ethereum.org/2014/03/28/schellingcoin-a-minimal-trust-universal-data-feed/ (Mar. 24, 
2014). 
43
 This mechanism allows users to keep their decisions anonymous during the first round. 
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submitted value between the 25th and 75th percentile gain[ing] a reward of N 
tokens.”44 
Around the same time, Paul Sztorc proposed a similar mechanism to 
accomplish the same problem of providing a means of incorporating facts about the 
real world into a cryptocurrency.45 He suggested that the currency include, in 
addition to the store of value, VoteCoins, whose ownership changes as a result of 
voting activity. VoteCoins are gained by voting with the plurality on disputed 
decisions and lost by not voting or voting different from the plurality.46 Sztorc 
recommends the determination of the plurality decision using an algorithm based 
on matrix algebra,47 and he explains why his system gives participants the incentive 
to find Schelling points.48 
2. The P+Epsilon Attack 
In a later blog post, Buterin describes a potential attack on Schelling points 
coordination schemes conceived by Andrew Miller.49 Buterin considers a simple 
coordination game, in which one is rewarded with P coins if one votes for the same 
result as the majority. An attacker, however, credibly commits, perhaps using an 
Ethereum contract, to pay X, which exceeds P by a small amount Epsilon, to each 
participant if (1) the participant voted the incorrect answer, and (2) the majority 
voted the correct answer. Thus, the participant will be better off voting the incorrect 
answer if the majority votes the correct answer (because of the higher payment) and 
will also be better off voting the incorrect answer if the majority votes the incorrect 
answer (because of the baseline rules of the coordination game). If everyone 
reasons along similar lines, each player will vote the incorrect answer, thus 
sabotaging the game. Making the attack more attractive is that the attacker does not 
need to pay the money, because the money only needs to be paid if the majority 
votes for the correct answer. 
Though Buterin and Miller do not mention it, similar mechanisms exist in 
the real world, as illustrated in the case of Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum.50 Mesa 
offered to buy Unocal with a two-tier tender offer. The first tier of the offer was for 
just over 50% of the company. Shareholders successfully tendering would receive 
this amount, and Mesa would then use its majority interest to effect a second tier of 
                                                 
44
 Buterin, supra note 42. 
45
 Paul Sztorc, Truthcoin: Peer-to-Peer Oracle System and Prediction Marketplace (Dec. 14, 2015), 
available at http://www.truthcoin.info/papers/truthcoin-whitepaper.pdf. 
46
 Id. at 3. 
47
 Id. at 13. 
48
 Id. at 13-14. 
49
 Vitalik Buterin, The P + epsilon Attack, https://blog.ethereum.org/2015/01/28/p-epsilon-attack/. 
50
 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). 
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lower value to buy out the remaining shares. A shareholder’s incentive is always to 
tender in this situation, regardless of the value of the first tier relative to the current 
value of the first. If the tender offer is successful (that is, at least half of shares are 
tendered), then it is better to have as many shares as possible redeemed in the first 
tier. If the tender offer is not successful, then it does not matter whether one 
tendered. If every shareholder reasons accordingly, then any two-tiered tender offer 
will succeed, at least assuming that the courts do not interfere with it. 
But attacks can generate counterattacks, and Unocal features one: the 
counter tender offer. Unocal announced that if Mesa’s tender was successful, then 
Mesa would buy back the rest of the stock for an amount greater than offered in the 
first tier of the tender offer.51 This reverses the optimal strategy for shareholders by 
making the alternative to tendering more attractive than tendering. If the tender 
offer is successful, then it is better not to have tendered, since one will receive more 
from the company. In the context of Schelling games, we must thus ask both 
whether a game can be designed to prevent the P + Epsilon attack and whether the 
game can be saved with counterattacks. 
Buterin considers approaches that might defeat the attack. He suggests that 
instead of having a single-round game, the game might occur over multiple rounds, 
with round N determining the payouts in round N – 1. “Theoretically,” Buterin 
argues, “this requires an attacker wishing to perform a cost-free attack to corrupt 
not just one round, but also all future rounds, making the required capital deposit 
that the attacker must make unbounded.” But that response is not sufficient. So long 
as an attacker commits funds to pay out once, then so long as the payouts never 
have to be made, the funds will be available for each successive round. An attacker 
need only to have the attack available on each round, since the beauty of the attack, 
like Unocal’s response to Mesa’s tender, is that the money does not actually need 
to be paid.  
Buterin, however, salvages his counterattack. Crediting Storcz’s TruthCoin, 
Buterin recognizes that if the amount at stake increases with the degree of 
contention, then the size of the bribe needed to corrupt successfully might have to 
be very high, as the attacker would need to be able to establish enough capital to 
make a payout in some future round in which the total amount at stake is 
unbounded. Suppose, for example, that if there is sufficient voting on the losing 
answer, then voting is simply extended to another round with higher stakes, and so 
on forever. So long as a counterattacker anticipates that eventually the stakes will 
be higher than the attacker’s payment commitment, the attack will fail in the first 
round, and the attacker will need to pay out right away. Thus, for the attack to 
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succeed, the attacker must establish that it “is capable of pulling off a 51% attack,”52 
i.e. that it has more money than all other participants in the game.  
Interestingly, even in a one-round game, a P + Epsilon attack could generate 
a counterattack with ever increasing resources on both sides. Suppose that the 
correct answer is “Yes” and that in the absence of an attack, a voter would receive 
1 for voting with the majority or -1 for voting against the plurality. The attacker 
promises to pay “No” voters 2 if “Yes” wins. A counterattacker might then credibly 
commit to paying “Yes” voters 2 if “No” wins. The extra incentives cancel out, and 
so the ordinary logic of the Schelling game returns, but with far more voters 
participating, since the voters will earn a profit no matter who wins. The attacker 
might then increase its offer, to protect its original investment, but so might a 
counterattacker. So long as the counterattacker can match any increased offers by 
the attacker, the counterattacker should expect to win this battle (and pay out 
nothing) if the underlying logic of the Schelling game is correct. This can be 
profitable for the counterattacker if the counterattacker puts money on “Yes,” so a 
counterattacker would have a built-in advantage over an attacker. Of course, a 
counterattacker might not emerge, but the mere possibility of a counterattack means 
that the attack may fail and result in a substantial payout. 
The counterattacker’s advantage depends on the correct Schelling point 
emerging once the attacker is neutralized. One might argue that those promoting 
the correct answer (the counterattackers) are no more likely to succeed than those 
promoting the incorrect answer (the attackers). But there is a strong argument that 
a counterattack is likely to fail—those defending the correct answer are likely to 
have a vested interest in the success of the cryptocurrency. If the cryptocurrency is 
attacked successfully, especially with an attack that ultimately costs the attacker 
nothing, then the Schelling game mechanism will not be trusted, and if the 
cryptocurrency itself relies on the Schelling mechanism, then the cryptocurrency 
itself is likely to fail. At least, this is the likely result if such attacks were successful 
a significant percentage of the time. Even if the payments from the attacker and 
counterattacker are nominally symmetric, they are in fact asymmetric, if a 
successful counterattack lowers the value of the cryptocurrency. This provides a 
built-in incentive for participants to favor the counterattacker over the attacker, and 
this in turn creates an incentive for counterattackers to emerge. 
With Schelling games, other counterattacks are possible. Buterin notes that 
participants might, via credible commitments agree to vote with probability just 
over 0.5 on the correct answer and probability just under 0.5 on the incorrect 
answer, allowing the correct answer to prevail and still to generate part of the 
bribe.53 In any event, as Buterin seems to concede, with a multiple-round game in 
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which the stakes rise over time, no counterattack of this sort is needed. Consider, 
for example, the forced transaction rules described in Section II.B. With those rules, 
one will have the incentive to force a sale or purchase of a security if one believes 
that the ultimate price is more likely to be on one side of the current valuation than 
the other. Similarly, with the simple rules identified in the previous section for 
Autonocoin, one will always have an incentive to place another bet on a binary 
issue if one expects that one is more likely to prevail than not if challenging the last 
decision. The attack will fail if more money is placed on the correct answer than 
the incorrect answer, and the ability of participants to wager more than the amount 
promised by the attacker is likely to make the attack fail. A caveat is that a genuine 
51% attack—or perhaps even an attack by a player with a plurality of voting 
shares—might succeed, but those with large interests will generally be those least 
likely to want to attack the system.54 
III. EXPERIMENTATION WITH SCHELLING POINT DECISIONMAKING 
Part II provided arguments suggesting that participants in Schelling point 
coordination games are likely to seek out the focal points corresponding to the 
normative questions posed, rather than to latch onto other focal points or to give 
into an attacker who promises a bonus to those who support the wrong answer. But 
we must be cautious in this conclusion. Schelling point games can have multiple 
Nash equilibria, and the prediction of which equilibrium will emerge is as much 
psychology as mathematics. Thus, the fate of Schelling point decisionmaking is an 
empirical matter. This Part describes some tentative evidence. To date, there has 
been no large-scale in the field experimentation with Schelling points built into a 
cryptocurrency, so the ultimate answer is unclear.  
A. Laboratory Experimentation 
A first line of evidence comes from a laboratory experiment on self-
resolving prediction markets markets55 by Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij.56 The 
                                                 
54
 Indeed, this may help explain why a similar hypothetical attack is not deployed on Bitcoin. Buterin 
notes that an attacker could create a Bitcoin fork with a double spend transaction. See id. (section 
describing “Further Consequences”). The attacker could then promise to pay more than the typical 
mining reward for a miner who successfully mines a block on the fork with the double spend 
transaction, if that fork ends up not becoming the official fork. The theory is that everyone would 
mine on the unofficial fork, and the money would not need to be paid. But such an attack has never 
been attempted. And it is likely that miners would ignore it, because if it worked, it ultimately would 
doom Bitcoin itself. 
55
 See supra text accompanying note 31. 
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experimenter recruited 1,000 participants and provided them with education about 
how prediction markets work.57 The subjects participated in a game in which they 
were given incentives to predict the proportion of black balls in an urn with black 
and white balls. Each subject would receive information in the form of balls drawn 
from an urn; in any single market run, each participant would receive a different 
random selection of balls. The subjects were randomized either to a treatment 
group, using self-resolving prediction markets, or to a control group, using 
prediction markets that resolved based on the actual number of black balls in the 
urn. The experimenters verified that the members of the treatment group in fact 
understood that their payouts would depend on later market prices, not on the 
number of black balls actually in the urn.58 
Ahlstrom-Vij assessed whether the results of the self-resolving prediction 
markets were similar to those of the non-self-resolving markets. Indeed, they were, 
with similar results in both volatility and in accuracy (indeed, slightly better in 
accuracy though not significantly better).59 Ahlstrom-Vij interprets this to be 
evidence in favor of a “face value hypothesis,” namely that participants in self-
resolving prediction markets will in fact pay attention to the questions posed, rather 
than to any arbitrary focal point.60 This is, as Ahlstrom-Vij recognizes, a tentative 
conclusion. Perhaps the experimental subjects, though understanding how self-
resolving markets work, did not recognize the arbitrariness of the focal point. Or, 
perhaps the result would be different if subjects were given an opportunity to 
communicate with one another. Ahlstrom-Vij notes that a promising direction for 
future work would be to run a similar experiment but in which some participants 
are given an external incentive to manipulate the market and other participants 
know that such manipulation is possible.61 Nonetheless, the study provides some 
reason to think that at least absent efforts to move participants from the focal 
solution, participants will naturally compete on the assumption that all others are 
looking for the same focal point. 
B. Augur 
A real-world experiment lies in the Augur project.62 This project uses 
Ethereum-based smart contracts to implement and resolve prediction markets. 
                                                 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
57
 For a detailed description of the methodology, see id. at 6-8. 
58
 Id. at 12. 
59
 Id. at 8-12. 
60
 Id. at 13. 
61
 Id.  
62
 See https://www.augur.net/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2019). 
  DECENTRALIZED GOVERNANCE     19 
 
 
   
 
Thus, decentralized participants can bet on the result of events, including political 
elections and sports competitions. The project includes its own coin, REP, with a 
current market capitalization of over $100 million.63  The problem facing Augur is 
the same as the problem Buterin noted in his SchellingCoin blog post.64 The smart 
contracts predicting events must be resolved based on events in the outside world, 
so the decentralized system must employ some attack-resistant mechanism for 
incentivizing and processing reports of what in fact happened in the outside world.  
The designers of Augur in fact do everything that they can to resist allowing 
Augur to serve as a general mechanism for Schelling point games.65 The Augur 
rules require the creator of a market to post a “validity bond,” which will be lost if 
the market turns out to be ambiguous,66 in which case the market is to be resolved 
with a special “invalid” answer being correct. Indeed, some participants in the 
project were motivated by a desire to ensure that the Augur prediction markets were 
not Schelling point games, which they regarded as being indeterminate.67 Yet the 
designers appear to have recognized that there might be disputes and that no 
linguistic standard can eliminate all ambiguity. For example, there might be a weak 
argument that a market has a latent ambiguity, and then the question becomes 
whether it is ambiguous enough to make the “invalid” answer correct. 
Thus, there will be at least some circumstances in which Augur does need 
to resolve questions that ultimately involve some subjective component. The 
mechanism works as follows: While the underlying bet in Augur is of Ethereum 
cryptocurrency, the separate REP token is used to encourage accurate reporting of 
event outcomes. In every seven-day period, all REP holders who participate in the 
reporting process by reporting outcomes receive rewards for doing so. After an 
initial report is received, there occurs “a 7-day period during which any REP holder 
has the opportunity to dispute the market’s tentative outcome.”68The dispute 
requires placing a bond against the tentative outcome; if the sum of such bonds 
exceeds some threshold, then the tentative outcome is successfully disputed. But 
then this resolution itself can be successfully disputed by placing even higher 
bonds. Eventually, when the dispute size exceeds some threshold, Augur goes into 







 Jack Peterson et al., Augur: A Decentralized Oracle and Perdiction Market Platform (July 12, 
2018), available at https://www.augur.net/whitepaper.pdf . 
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a fork state, with a separate fork for each resolution. Each Augur participant must 
choose a fork, and the fork that receives the greatest number of contributions 
survives, and all money invested in any other fork is forfeited.69  
This process bears a substantial resemblance to a multi-round Schelling 
point game, in particular to the proof-of-belief system embodied by the Autonocoin 
proposal. At least in the fork round, each participant has an incentive to place REP 
currency on the fork that other participants are most likely to choose. At the same 
time, the Augur design is intended to make such a fork exceedingly rare, requiring 
a dispute (rare in the first place) to escalate over multiple rounds. To date, no fork 
has occurred. Nonetheless, all incentives in Augur are ultimately based on the 
possibility of such a fork. An obviously incorrect choice in a fork round would 
likely doom confidence in the Augur project. Yet this is unlikely, for the reasons 
explored above. With so much at stake, participants would have incentives to 
choose the correct answer (or the answer they think that most would think better, 
in the case of a genuinely close question). It certainly could not be manipulated 
using the REP currency itself, since no one would want to choose an option that 
would pay them more of this currency if the success of that option would 
simultaneously make such currency worthless.70 
A mechanism designed to resolve Schelling points on subjective questions 
could use the same mechanism. But forks might turn out to be considerably more 
common, and thus a lower cost resolution is useful. Nonetheless, any Schelling 
point mechanism that allows those confident that an outcome is wrong to wager an 
ever-increasing amount of money on the opposite solution should provide similar 
incentives. It will be rare for disputes to involve a significant portion of the 
available cryptocurrency, but the possibility of such disputes serves as a 
disciplining mechanism for participants. 
C. Token-Curated Registries 
A final source of evidence about Schelling point games may emerge from 
token-curated registries, should they attract sufficient interest.71 A token-curated 
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registry is simply a list of entities that meet some criterion, such as a “top colleges” 
list or “best tourist attractions in Nashville” list. After initial token distribution, 
anyone can apply to add an entry to a token-curated registry by depositing a token 
bond of a minimum size. An existing holder of the token may then challenge the 
application by putting up a counter-bond. Other token holders may then assign their 
tokens to either a “Yes” or “No” vote, and the side with more total investment earns 
the tokens of the side with less total investment. This is a cursory description, but 
the core structure should by now be familiar. The goal is to give each participant 
an incentive to seek the focal-point solution.72 
Token-curated registries are in their infancy, with relatively at stake. Alex 
Tabarrok has offered some skepticism about the mechanism, noting that “[t]he truth 
is a Schelling point but it is rarely the only Schelling point.”73 An early token-
curated registry called Adchain seeks to identify “real publishers” as a way of 
distinguishing these from publishers of fake content that seek to defraud Internet 
advertisers.74 Yet the process resulted in Facebook and the New York Times being 
refused admission as a result of moral concerns among participants. This is not 
necessarily inconsistent with a search for focal points, but it seems to indicate that 
participants considered moral issues separate from the goals of the registry creator. 
At this point, however, the registry is quite small (consisting of a motley group of 
only about 100 publishers), and it may be difficult for a project capitalized entirely 
by its own (potentially worthless) token to generate enough interest to give 
participants robust incentives. If the group were larger and the list came to be taken 
seriously, then participants would have an incentive to protect their investment, 
likely by making choices according to the interests of advertisers rather than 
according to their own moral lights. Should a token-curated registry be capitalized 
at least partly with a valuable token (such as Ethereum), better evidence on the 
viability of Schelling point schemes may be generated. 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
 The preliminary experiments in the last Part have primarily occurred over 
the past year, and thus evidence of the viability and scalability of Schelling point 
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decisionmaking is scarce. The goal of this short symposium contribution has been 
to explain the logic of formal Schelling point games and explore the critiques of 
decisionmaking systems predicated on them. A full empirical evaluation will have 
to wait for the day, should it come, when significant venture capital is staked behind 
some system relying on Schelling point decisionmaking. Whether this occurs will 
depend in part on whether resolving disputes in this way rather than through 
conventional approaches has value, a subject to which this short piece does not 
contribute.75 
Nonetheless, the literature at least can allow for development of 
recommendations about the design of Schelling point decisionmaking. A variety of 
mechanisms may give parties incentives to seek out focal point resolutions of 
normative questions, but any successful mechanism, at its core, must ensure that 
each participant makes a bet that will pay off better if it is the same as any bet 
announced by future participants. In addition, a mechanism must allow participants 
to place ever larger challenges to the current resolution, thus providing financial 
incentives for third parties to study the relevant issue and to contribute to the focal 
resolution. Typically, the game will proceed in rounds, with participants in any 
round anticipating some probability that attempting to move the focal point 
resolution will lead to a challenge in the next round. The process may end with 
some probability after each round,76 or continue so long as participants are willing 
to charge previous assessments with higher stakes.77 
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